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Abstract
We study a basic auction design problem with online supply. There are two unit-demand bidders and
two types of items. The first item type will arrive first for sure, and the second item type may or may
not arrive. The auctioneer has to decide the allocation of an item immediately after each item arrives,
but is allowed to compute payments after knowing how many items arrived. For this problem we show
that there is no deterministic truthful and individually rational mechanism that, even with unbounded
computational resources, gets any finite approximation factor to the optimal social welfare.
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1 Introduction
We consider the following fundamental mechanism design problem with online supply.
There are two unit-demand bidders1 and two types of items. To begin with, both bidders submit
their bids for both items. The first item type arrives first, for sure, and the mechanism has to
allocate the item to one of the bidders right away. Then the second item type may or may not
arrive and is only allocated if it does. The mechanism can compute payments at the end, after
knowing whether the second item arrives. The objective is to optimize social welfare, while
ensuring that the mechanism is truthful in dominant strategies.
Relevance of the model There has been a tremendous amount of work motivated by online advertising,
but much of it studies either the online or truthfulness aspects separately. E.g., Mehta et al. [34] study the
purely algorithmic problem, and Edelman et al. [20], Varian [43] consider just a single auction. The goal here
is to study these two aspects together, and the particular choices in our model reflect how online advertising
works: advertisers specify bids for possible item types ahead of time. Items, which are ad opportunities,
arrive online and must be allocated immediately upon arrival, as they perish otherwise. Payments can be
computed at the end: advertisers are usually billed at regular intervals. The model can be easily extended
to include capacity constraints larger than one and/or budget constraints. Optimizing social welfare is an
important objective even for a for-profit seller in a competitive environment, as keeping consumers happy in
the long-run is crucial.
We focus on mechanisms that are deterministic, truthful in dominant strategies and individually rational
(IR). Practical considerations require deterministic and IR mechanisms, while truthful in dominant strategies
is the natural notion when no Bayesian assumptions are made about bidder types. Moreover, given the
simplicity of the setting, it is natural to expect such a mechanism.
The problem we consider (with two bidders and two items) is the simplest possible version that retains
three crucial aspects: online supply, truthfulness, and multidimensional type spaces. Removing any of these
aspects immediately yields a simple and easy solution, even with many bidders and many items.
• Offline version. If we know which items are available, we can simply run the VCG mechanism to get
the optimal social welfare.
• No truthfulness. If we only care about the algorithmic problem of maximizing welfare online, then
this is a well known generalization of the online bipartite matching problem. The greedy algorithm is
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competitive.
• Single parameter types. There is only a single item type, and we may get an unknown number of
copies of this item (identical items case). The type of an agent is just a single value. In this case,
allocating the items to agents in the decreasing order of values optimizes social welfare. This is in
fact the VCG allocation and is therefore truthful (but only because we can compute payments in the
end).
Existing work that combines both the online and then incentive nature of the problem (e.g. Babaioff et al.
[8]) consider only non-trivial variants of the identical items case and no prior work has addressed a multi-
dimensional mechanism design setting (see Section 1.2 for detailed exposition).
1A unit demand bidder has a valuation of the following form: for a given set of items S, the valuation v(S) = maxj∈S vj . She
tries to maximize her utility, which is quasi linear, i.e., it is the valuation of the set of items allocated to her minus her payments.
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1.1 Our Contribution
Some examples Given that there are only two bidders and two item types, one might expect some simple
mechanism to give something like a 2 approximation, but in reality it is otherwise. Here are a few examples
that we encourage the reader to work out and see what’s good or bad about them before proceeding further.
Let v = (v1, v2) be the bids of bidder V for items 1 and 2, and similarly let w = (w1, w2) be the bids of
bidderW .
We start with some natural allocation algorithms. The question for these algorithms is whether there
exist payments that make them truthful.
Example 1: Greedy algorithm It is well known [22] that the following online greedy algorithm gets
a competitive ratio of 2 for unit demand bidders, for the purely optimization problem without incentives,
even with n bidders and m items. The algorithm assigns each item to the bidder with the highest marginal
valuation, i.e., if bidder i is currently assigned a set of items, the maximum item of which he values at v′i,
and his value for the new item is vi, then his marginal valuation for item i is vi − v
′
i.
Example 2: A min{m,n} approximation algorithm Assign each item to the highest bidder for that
item. As an algorithm, this gets a factor ofmin{m,n}, wherem is the number of items and n is the number
of agents.
Example 3: Bundling Both items are allocated to the bidder with the highest bid among v1, v2, w1, w2.
Example 4: VCG-ish allocation Assign the first item to the highest bidder. Assign the second item
according to the allocation that maximizes welfare, on hindsight, if could reallocate both items (i.e., the
VCG allocation if we knew both items would arrive).
With some effort, one can see that none of these algorithms have any payments that render them truthful.
The one for which this is easiest to see is perhaps the Bundling example. Suppose that v2 is the highest,
with w1 > v1 ≈ 0, and only item 1 arrives. We will allocate the item to V , but what should we charge her?
IR forces the payment to be essentially 0. Then bidding very low on item 1 and very high on item 2 is a
beneficial misreport when only item 1 arrives.
One could ask if there are any reasonable allocation algorithms that are truthful. Indeed there are, and
here’s an example.
Example 5: Discount mechanism When item 1 arrives, assign it to the highest bidder. When item 2
arrives, offer it to bidder V at a price of max{w1, w2}+ (v1 − w1)
+, and offer it to bidder W at a price of
max{v1, v2} + (w1 − v1)
+ (here x+ = max(x, 0)). Whoever takes the second item, pays the posted price
on the second item, and doesn’t pay anything more even if they won the first item. If there is a bidder who
won only the first item (either because second item didn’t arrive, or he lost the second item), he pays the
other bidder’s bid for the first item.
Unfortunately, Example 5 does not get any finite approximation. In light of the above examples, we ask
the following question:
Main Question. Does there exist a deterministic truthful+IR mechanism that, even with un-
bounded computational resources, gets a finite approximation factor to social welfare, when
items arrive online?
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Our main result is an impossibility: there is no deterministic truthful + IR mechanism that, even with
unbounded computational resources, can get any finite approximation to social welfare. This is surprising,
and is qualitatively different from other impossibilities, because optimal approximation ratios usually grow
as a function of the number of bidders n, or the number of items m. This result shows a drastic contrast
w.r.t the problem with a single item type (with identical copies), where we can implement the optimal
allocation (for social welfare) when payments are computed at the end. Even if the payments are required
to be computed on the fly for the single item case, as in Babaioff et al. [8], the approximation ratio is Θ(n),
which is in stark contrast to the answer here, which is∞. We emphasize once again that this is the simplest
possible problem for which one could have hoped for a positive answer, and it is quite surprising that the
answer is an impossibility.
Technical takeaways Traditional characterizations of truthfulness such as weak/cyclic monotonicity only
consider the allocation to a single agent, fixing the reports of everyone else, and fixing the supply. Our
first step is to extend this characterization when the allocation is required to satisfy sequential consistency:
the allocation must satisfy weak monotonicity at every point of time, i.e., after the arrival of each item, the
allocation for the set of items seen so far must satisfy weak monotonicity for every agent. Even this is not
sufficient, as there are allocations such as the one in Example 5 that satisfy this sequential consistency. We
further need to reason about how the allocation of one agent changes when we change the report of the other
agent, under the constraint that it achieves a finite approximation. We give more details and intuition for
how we do this in Section 2.1, and in the numerous figures throughout the paper.2
Randomization Our result implies that some sort of randomization is required to get any finite approxi-
mation to social welfare. Practically, randomization in the mechanism itself is not appealing. More practical
options are to assume some randomization in the arrival process, as has been done for the algorithmic ver-
sions, or a Bayesian setting where there is randomization in the types. See Section 4 for a more detailed
discussion on these options.
1.2 Related Work
Closely related work The results closest to our work are the ones that consider non trivial variants of the
identical items case, since they still have to deal with the combination of truthfulness and online supply.
1. Babaioff et al. [8] study the variant where the mechanism has to compute payments immediately af-
ter each item arrives. (As observed above, the problem is trivial when payments can be computed
at the end.) Even with this more stringent requirement, a trivial deterministic auction obtains an n
approximation in this setting, and they construct a simple universally truthful “powers-of-2” random-
ized mechanism that obtains an O(log n) approximation. On the negative side, they show that no
randomized mechanism can achieve a factor better than O(log log n) approximation.
2. Goel et al. [26] study a variant where each bidder has a budget constraint which specifies a hard upper
bound on the bidder’s total payment across all items, and additive valuations. The goal is now to get a
Pareto optimal allocation, rather than approximating the social welfare. They show that the adaptive
clinching auction of Dobzinski et al. [19] actually achieves this, in the adversarial arrival model. This
auction is truthful, and payments can be computed online too.
2We have generously added figures since they greatly help in understanding the structure, and as a result they significantly
lengthen the paper. We estimate that the figures add about 4 pages.
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3. Mahdian and Saberi [32] and Devanur and Hartline [15] consider the revenue maximization objective,
and show O(1) approximation ratios. The payments here are allowed to be computed at the end.
Other related Work We now briefly discuss the broader landscape of online mechanisms and algorithms
inspired by internet advertising.
There is a substantial body of work under dynamic mechanism design that studies truthful mechanism
design with online supply, but with the key difference being that the bidders’ types themselves are evolving
online [3, 4, 11, 28, 36, 38]. The setting is typically Bayesian, and the emphasis is on truthful elicitation
of these evolving types. This main source of difficulty is absent in our problem, since the bidder types are
fixed and elicited once in the beginning; thus one would expect our problem to be easier. The other variant
of online mechanisms is one where bidders arrive and depart online, while the supply is fixed and known
[5, 14, 25, 27, 29–31, 40]. Once again, the difficulties in these problems are orthogonal to that of ours; see
Section 2.1 for more discussion on this. For a survey on dynamic mechanism design, see Bergemann and
Said [10], Parkes [37], Vohra [44].
Online advertising has been the dominant driver of the internet economy, accounting for almost all the
revenue of two of the most important technology companies today, Google and Facebook. It has been
the motivation for numerous lines of research, most prominently online matching and its generalizations
[12, 16, 18, 22, 23, 33, 34], and various aspects of auction design [1, 21, 35, 43]. These two have largely
remained separate: online algorithms ignore strategic considerations and auction design mostly considers
a static setting. It is natural to combine the two aspects, and ask for mechanisms that are both online and
truthful, and many papers have done so, but capturing different aspects than us [6, 7, 9, 17].
2 Model and Main Result
We consider two bidders V,W and two possible items, 1, 2. Bidder V has type v = (v1, v2), where vi is his
value for item i. Similarly bidderW has a type w = (w1, w2). Both bidders are unit-demand. Item 1 arrives
in the first period. Item 2 may or may not arrive in the second period.
Amechanism is defined by its allocation and payment functions. We focus on deterministic mechanisms:
the functions xVi : R
2
+×R
2
+ → {0, 1} and x
W
i : R
2×R2 → {0, 1} denote the allocation of item i to bidders
V and W respectively, as a function of their (4-tuple) bids in R2+ × R
2
+. Similarly p
V (v,w) and pW (v,w)
denote the payments of bidders V andW as a function of their bids. We use R+ to denote the set of positive
real numbers union 0. We require the mechanism to irrevocably decide the allocation of item 1 immediately
after it arrives. However, the payment for the agents can be computed after two periods (i.e., after knowing
how many items arrived).
A mechanism is dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC) if irrespective of whether 1 or 2 items
arrive, irrespective of bidder W ’s reports, it is a dominant strategy for bidder V to report his true values
for both the items at the beginning of the game, and vice versa. A mechanism is IR if similarly under no
circumstances does the payment of an agent exceed her (reported) utility obtained by her allocation. Since
we focus on DSIC mechanisms, we avoid different notation for bids and true values.
We are interested in analyzing the welfare of the resulting outcome of the mechanism, which corresponds
to the utility of the bidders plus the revenue of the auctioneer. This boils down to the total value of the
resulting allocation. We are interested in comparing the latter with the welfare maximizing allocation,
which in this setting corresponds to the maximum weighted matching between the bidders and the items.
We say that a mechanism achieves an approximation factor H if for any possible reports v,w, the allocation
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of the mechanism achieves welfare that is at least 1/H times the value of the welfare maximizing allocation
for these reports.
With these definitions at hand, we are now ready to state our main result:
Theorem 1 (Main Theorem). No deterministic DSIC+IR mechanism gets a finite approximation factor.
Before delving into the technical exposition of the proof of the main theorem and in order to help the
reader get a high level glimpse of our approach and of the main insights behind our proof, we first present
in the next subsection a series of insights from our proof. Subsequently in Section 3 we give the complete
proof of Theorem 1.
2.1 Intuition, Insights and Proof Map
To build some intuition let’s start with how an efficient DSIC+IR mechanism would look had it had perfect
foresight of the arrival sequence. If only item 1 arrives, then the efficient DSIC+IR mechanism is the single
item second price auction, which would allocate the item to player V if:v1 ≥ w1 and to bidderW otherwise
(see Figure 1 (left)). However, if both items arrive then the efficient mechanism, i.e. the VCG mechanism,
allocates item 1 to player V and item 2 to playerW if: v1+w2 ≥ v2+w1 ⇔ v1−v2 ≥ w1−w2. Otherwise
it exchanges the allocation of goods (see Figure 1 (right)).
x = {1}
p = 0
v1
v2
w1
p = w1
x = {∅}
w1 − w2
x = {1}
x = {2}
v1
v2
p = 0
p = w1 − w2
45o
x = {1}
x = {2}
v1
v2
p = w2 − w1
p = 0
45o
w2 − w1
Figure 1: VCG allocation and payment when only one item arrives (left) and when two items arrive (two right).
Observe that the above two allocation rules are not sequentially consistent, i.e. if the mechanism decides
the allocation of item 1 to player V be simply doing the comparison v1 ≥ w1, then there will be cases of
v,w, where in the second stage, if item 2 happens to arrive, the efficient mechanism would want to change
the allocation of item 1. In particular, the latter happens if v1 ≥ w1 but v1 − v2 < w1 − w2. Thus we have
to change the way that we allocate goods on some of the two days.
Since VCG is not sequentially consistent, an alternative approach would be to start from a sequentially
consistent and approximately efficient allocation algorithm. The most well known and natural one is the
greedy algorithm which allocates each arriving item greedily to the bidder with the highest current marginal
valuation for it. Thus the first item would be allocated to player V if v1 ≥ w1. If player V wins item 1,
the second item would also be allocated to him if v2 − v1 ≥ w1. If he lost item 1, the he is allocated item
2 if v2 ≥ w2 − w1. This allocation function is depicted in Figure 2. However, this allocation cannot be
made truthful by any payment scheme. The main reason behind this is the discontinuity of the allocation of
item 2 as the value of player V for item 1 ranges from [0,∞). In the region around v1 ∈ [w1 − δ, w1 + δ],
the threshold value for winning item 2 is a discontinuous function of the value of player V for item 1. This
creates an incentive for a type v who lies around this point of discontinuity and loses item 2, to lie about
5
w1
x = {1}
x = {∅}
v1
v2
45o
w2 − w1
2w2
x = {2}
x = {1, 2}
Figure 2: The allocation function of the online greedy algorithm.
his value for item 1 and win item 2 instead, paying the lower of the two thresholds around the threshold
discontinuity point.
After examining how simple solutions fail, we now move to sketching the proof of our main result and
outlaying our characterization of DSIC+IR mechanisms. Characterizing truthful mechanisms, even in a
multi-dimensional setting, is fairly well understood in the case of a single agent [2, 24, 39, 41] (equivalently,
when the bids of the other agents are fixed). As a first step, our characterization also needs to blend in the
requirement of sequential consistency to these characterization.3
Our characterization starts from observing that since the mechanism has to be DSIC+IR even if one
item arrives, then it has to be that for any value w of W , the allocation of item 1 to player V has to
look like a single item allocation, i.e. he gets the item if his value v1 for item 1 is above some threshold
π1(w). Given this, DSIC+IR constraints, together with the fact that the mechanism must be achieving a
finite approximation, gives us a complete characterization of how the allocation and payment function of a
single player must look for the second item, for any fixed valuation of his opponent (modulo a corner case
that we deal with in the technical part).
In particular, we show that for any fixed w of playerW , the allocation of item 2 to player V , happens if:
• Player V loses item 1, i.e. v1 ≤ π1(w) and v2 ≥ π2(w) for some threshold π2(w) ≥ π1(w)
• Player V wins item 1 and v2 − v1 ≥ π2(w)− π1(w).
In any case if player V happens to win item 2, then he has to pay π2(w), irrespective of whether he also
won or not item 1. This characterization is given pictorially in Figure 3. The analogue characterization also
holds for player W , keeping player V ’s valuation v fixed. Unlike the VCG mechanism the latter figure has
the vertical line that determines the allocation to item 1. This line is what is causing most of the trouble in
achieving constant factor approximations. Intuitively, what VCG would want to do in the case that item 2
actually arrives, is erase the vertical line and continue the diagonal line until it hits the axes. Finally, unlike
the greedy algorithm, a DSIC mechanism has to have the boundary that defines the region for allocation of
item 2, be a continuous function (i.e. the 45o line must meet the horizontal line at π2(w)). These are two
crucial properties that any DSIC+IR and sequentially consistent mechanism has to satisfy and the reason
why simple solutions do not work.
3We note that potentially some preliminary lemmas that we present could be derived by “heavy hammers” in mechanism design,
such as weak monotonicity. However, we felt that invoking such results, for proving very preliminary basic lemmas would do more
to distract the reader than to help in the understanding. Hence we prove them from first principles, since our setting of two bidders
and two items is simple enough). The full characterization presented in Figure 3 cannot be shown by simply invoking such results
and requires more subtle arguments that we present.
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π1(w)
x = {1}
x = {2}
v1
v2
x = {∅}
p = π2(w)
π2(w)
p = π1(w)
45o
x = {1, 2}
p = π2(w)
Figure 3: The complete characterization of allocation and payment functions of DSIC+IR mechanisms that achieve finite approxi-
mation factors.
However, this single-player characterization is still not sufficient to draw the conclusion that no DSIC+IR
mechanism can achieve a finite approximation. To arrive at the impossibility, we need to argue about the
allocation and payment of both players simultaneously. Given that this requires arguing about functions in
the four dimensional space of v1, v2, w1, w2, this presents an uphill battle. The key argument in the epilogue
of the proof of our main result, which is also the hardest and most intricate part of our analysis is as follows:
assume for now that all items are always allocated to some bidder, hence the allocation of one player is the
complement of the allocation of the other. Now consider how the allocation changes as bidderW ’s value for
item 1 shifts (while his value for item 2 remains fixed). A crucial and non-trivial step in the proof is to show
that if the allocation of bidder V changes as a result, it must be that there are points in bidder V ’s type space
that go from winning both items to losing item 2. Hence, bidder W goes from winning nothing to winning
at least item 2. This means that solely the value for item 1 of bidderW determined whether he wins nothing
or item 2. This cannot be truthful for bidderW , since he would want to slightly misreport his value for item
1 and win item 2. Hence, bidder V ’s allocation remains completely unchanged and subsequently bidder’s
W allocation remains completely unchanged. However, this also implies that bidder’sW allocation for item
1 is also insensitive to his bid for item 1. The latter can lead to unbounded approximation ratios.
Finally, the proof of the theorem requires dropping the assumption that all items are always allocated.
To achieve this we focus only on small sub-regions in bidder W ’s and V ’s type space, in which both items
have to be allocated to some bidder if we want to have finite approximation and which are sufficient for
making the argument that insensitivity of bidderW ’s allocation of item 1 is insensitive to his report for item
1 in this sub-region leads to unbounded approximation factor. Defining these sub-regions requires a series of
delicate lemmas that argue about potential changes to one player’s allocation function as the other player’s
type changes, under the assumption that the mechanism achieves some finite approximation.
3 Proof of Main Result
In this section we provide the complete proof of our main theorem. We begin by some basic characterizations
of properties that all DSIC and IR mechanisms need to satisfy. We then refine further this characterization
when we also add the requirement that the mechanism achieves a constant factor approximation. Finally, we
present the core final arguments of our proof which unlike the first two sections, requires arguing simultane-
ously about the allocation and payment functions of both players, rather than how the allocation of a single
player looks like, holding the other player fixed.
In most of the Lemma statements, we show that the allocation and payment functions are restricted in
some ways. These restrictions apply to both xV (·, ·) and xW (·, ·), and similarly to both pV (·, ·) and pW (·, ·).
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However we prove the statements only for xV (·, ·) and pV (·, ·) as the corresponding proof for bidder W is
identical.
3.1 DSIC + IR Mechanisms
In this section, we show necessary conditions for a deterministic online mechanism to be DSIC and IR.
These conditions are very similar to characterizations for the offline case [13, 42]. Essentially, what this
amounts to is that every DSIC+ IR mechanism looks like this from the point of view of V : the two items
are offered at prices π1(w) and π2(w), that do not depend on v. In case V is allocated only one of the two
items, he pays the corresponding price. We will deal with the case where she is allocated both items in the
next part. In the next 3 lemmas, we only state the conclusion for V , and the symmetric statement for W is
true as well.
Lemma 2. For every deterministic DSIC+IR mechanism, there must exist a threshold function π1(w) such
that:
∀w ∈ R2+, ∀v ∈ R
2
+ : x
V
1 (v,w) =
{
1 if v1 > π1(w)
0 if v1 < π1(w)
π1(w)
x ={1} or {1,2}x ={0} or {2}
v1
v2
Figure 4: Characterization of allocation for item 1
Proof in Appendix A.
Remark 2.1. It is good to remind oneself that while the statement of Lemma 2 is true always, the claims
made in the proof of Lemma 2 regarding payments are true only in the case that was used in the proof,
namely, where item 1 alone arrives. This is because we allow the mechanism designer to compute payments
after knowing whether one item arrived or two items arrived, and thus the conclusions regarding payments
drawn from one case need not apply to the other. The allocation function on the other hand has to be de-
termined immediately after each item arrives. Thus the conclusions drawn in the proof regarding allocation
function by referring to the case where only one item arrives extends to the case where both items arrive
too. Note that the Lemma statement refers only to the allocation function.
Lemma 3. For every deterministic DSIC+IR mechanism, there must exist a threshold function π2(w) such
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that:
∀w ∈ R2+, ∀v ∈ R
2
+ s.t. v1 < π1(w) : x
V
2 (v,w) =
{
1 if v2 > π2(w)
0 if v2 < π2(w)
pV (v,w) =
{
π2(w) if v2 > π2(w)
0 if v2 < π2(w)
π1(w)
x ={1} or {1,2}x ={2}
v1
v2
x ={∅}
p = π2(w)
π2(w)
Figure 5: Characterization of allocation and payment for item 2, conditional on losing item 1.
Proof in Appendix A.
Remark 3.1. A possible source of confusion here is for the reader to point out “The proof of Lemma 3
point 3 just proves that π2 remains the same for all v : v1 < π1. But what about v : v1 ≥ π1? How
could you conclude that π2 is purely a function of w without arguing about v : v1 ≥ π1?”. This is not a
meaningful question because π2 is a threshold function that was introduced to describe the allocation in the
region v : v1 < π1, i.e., π2 has a domain of [0, π1) × R
2
+. Thus the question of “what happens to π2 when
v1 ≥ π1” is meaningless.
Lemma 4. For every deterministic DSIC+IR mechanism,
∀w ∈ R2+,∀v ∈ R
2
+ s.t. {x
V
1 (v,w) = 1, x
V
2 (v,w) = 0}, we have p
V (v,w) = π1
π1(w)
x ={1}
x ={2}
v1
v2
x = {∅}
p = π2(w)
π2(w)
p = π1(w)
x ={1,2}
x ={1,2}
x ={1,2}
Figure 6: Characterization of payment when only item 1 is allocated.
Proof in Appendix A.
9
3.2 Refining Characterization under Finite Approximation
From now on, we assume that the mechanism also gets a finite approximation, and further refine the nec-
essary conditions we have so far. Basically, we show finiteness and positivity of the thresholds. Further
we show that π2 ≥ π1 always, and when π2 > π1 these two thresholds together completely determine
the allocation function for bidder V : in case he wins the first item, he is also allocated the second item if
v2 − π2 > v1 − π1, and his payment is only π2. If π2 = π1, then in one of the 4 regions, namely B
V
R , the
mechanism has the freedom to allocate to bidder V just item 1 or both items. This ambiguity in allocation
is eliminated when π2 > π1, and V does not get item 2 in B
V
R , and pays π1. All this is crucial when we
construct the main argument in Section 3.3.
The next two lemmas follow by considering v,w values that would lead to unbounded approximations
if the thresholds were either∞ or 0. Once again, for Lemmas 5-9, we only state the conclusion for V and
the symmetric statement forW holds as well.
Lemma 5. For every deterministic DSIC+IR mechanism that gets a finite approximation factor,
1. It always allocates item 1 to some player.
2. ∀w ∈ R2+, we have π1 <∞. Further, ∀w ∈ R
2
+ : w1 > 0, we have π1 > 0.
Proof. Consider a mechanism that gets a finite approximation factor H , and consider the case where item 2
does not arrive. If for some v,w, the mechanism does not allocate item 1, then the approximation factor for
the mechanism is unbounded.
If at some w the mechanism had π1 = ∞, let v1 = (H + 1)w1. In this case, bidder V still doesn’t get
the item, making the approximation factor to be H + 1 which is larger than H .
If for some w : w1 6= 0, the said mechanism had π1 = 0, let v1 =
w1
H+1 . In this case bidder V still gets
the item, making the approximation factor to be H + 1 which is larger than H .
Lemma 6. For every deterministic DSIC+IR mechanism that gets a finite approximation factor, ∀w ∈ R2+ :
w1 > 0, we have π2 <∞.
Proof. Fix a w ∈ R2+ : w1 > 0. By Lemma 5, note that 0 < π1 <∞ for such a w. Suppose π2 =∞ for the
said point w. Now, consider a point v s.t. v2 >> max{v1, w1, w2} and v1 < π1. At such a v, item 2 should
necessarily go to bidder V for a finite approximation. Having π2 =∞ implies this will not happen.
Notation For every deterministic DSIC+IR mechanism that gets a finite approximation factor, the follow-
ing four sets are well defined. Fix a bid w ∈ R2+ : w1 > 0 of bidderW . By Lemma 5, such a mechanism has
π1 > 0, and thus the domain of π2, namely [0, π1)×R
2
+ is non-empty. Thus the value of π2 is well-defined
for any fixed w ∈ R2+ with w1 > 0, making the 4 sets below well-defined.
1. Bottom-Left-V: BVL (w) = {v ∈ R
2
+ : v1 < π1, v2 < π2} .
2. Bottom-Right-V: BVR (w) = {v ∈ R
2
+ : v1 > π1, v2 − π2 < v1 − π1} .
3. Top-Left-V: T VL (w) = {v ∈ R
2
+ : v1 < π1, v2 > π2} .
4. Top-Right-V: T VR (w) = {v ∈ R
2
+ : v1 > π1, v2 − π2 > v1 − π1}.
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π1(w)
v1
v2
π2(w)
45o
T VL T
V
R
BVL
BVR
Figure 7: Four crucial regions for characterization of allocation functions. All these regions are non-empty.
Further both π1 and π2 are finite, making all four sets non-empty. We will use the non-emptiness of T
V
R
later in the proof. The names are meant to be indicative of which portions of the positive quadrant of bidder
V ’s type space these sets occupy. Similarly, fixing a bid v ∈ R2+ : v1 > 0 of bidder V , we define four sets
in the type space of bidder W : BWL (v), B
W
R (v), T
W
L (v) and T
W
R (v). We drop the arguments when it is
clear from the context, i.e., we say T VR instead of T
V
R (w). Given that these regions are non-trivial, Lemma
7 shows that V gets both items in T VR , Lemma 8 shows that π2 ≥ π1 and Lemma 9 shows that she doesn’t
get item 2 in BVR when π2 > π1.
Lemma 7. For every deterministic DSIC+IR mechanism that gets a finite approximation factor,
∀w ∈ R2+ : w1 > 0,∀v ∈ T
V
R we have {x
V
1 (v,w) = x
V
2 (v,w) = 1, p
V (v,w) = π2}
π1(w)
x ={1}
x ={2}
v1
v2
x ={∅}
p = π2(w)
π2(w)
p = π1(w)
x ={1,2}
x ={1,2}
x ={1,2}
45o
p = π2(w)
Figure 8: Characterization of the allocation and payment function in the four crucial regions. All values in T VR are allocated both
items and charged a price of π2(w).
Proof. To prove the allocation part, fix a w with w1 > 0, and consider a v ∈ T
V
R . For any such v, by
Lemma 2 xV1 (v,w) = 1. Suppose, x
V
2 (v,w) = 0. Then bidder V with value v ∈ T
V
R , has an incentive to
report a v ∈ T VL . By Lemma 3, such a report earns the bidder a utility of v2 − π2 which, by the definition
of T VR , is strictly larger than his current utility of v1 − π1. To see that his current utility is v1 − π1 note
that when a bidder gets only item 1, by Lemma 4 he has to pay π1. To prove the payment part, fix a w and
consider a v ∈ T VR . Since we just showed that all v ∈ T
V
R have x
V
1 (v,w) = x
V
2 (v,w) = 1, it follows from
DSIC that pV (v,w) for all v ∈ T VR must be the same, say p. We know from Lemma 3 that for all v ∈ T
V
L we
have pV (v,w) = π2. We claim that this immediately implies that p = π2. Suppose on the contrary p 6= π2.
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π1(w)
x ={1}
x ={2}
v1
v2
x = {∅}
p = π2(w)
π2(w)
p = π1(w)
x ={1,2}
x ={1,2}
45o
x ={1,2}
π1(w)
x ={1}
x ={2}
v1
v2
x = {∅}
p = π2(w)
π2(w)
p = π1(w)
x ={1,2}
x ={1,2}
45
x ={1,2}
p 6= π2(w)
AB
Figure 9: Profitable deviations if both items are not allocated at some point above the 45o line (left) and if when both items are
allocated above the 45o line the payment is not equal to π2(w) (right).
1. Say p > π2. Then v’s in T
V
R with v2 ≥ v1 (e.g. point A in Figure 9) have an incentive to report in
T VL (e.g. point B in Figure 9) to receive a utility v2−π2 which is strictly larger than the utility v2− p
they get currently.
2. And if p < π2, then v’s in T
V
L with v2 ≥ v1 (e.g. point B in Figure 9) have an incentive to report to
a v in T VR (e.g. point A in Figure 9) to a get a utility of v2 − p which is strictly larger than the utility
v2 − π2 they get currently.
Therefore we have pV (v,w) = π2 for all v ∈ T
V
R .
Lemma 8. For every deterministic DSIC+IR mechanism that gets a finite approximation factor, ∀w ∈ R2+ :
w1 > 0, we have π2(w) ≥ π1(w).
π1(w)
x ={1}x ={2}
v1
v2
x = {∅}
p = π2(w)
π2(w)
p = π1(w)
x ={1,2}
x ={1,2}
45o
x={1,2}
p = π2(w)
π1(w)
x = {1}
x = {2}
v1
v2
x = {∅}
p = π2(w)
π2(w)
p = π1(w)
x = {1, 2}
x = {1, 2}
x = {1, 2}
45o
p = π2(w)
π2(w)
A
B
Figure 10: The threshold for item 2 has to be at last as large as the threshold for item 1. Otherwise the right figure portrays a
profitable deviation.
Proof. Fix a w s.t. w1 > 0. Note that by Lemma 5, finite approximation factor immediately implies that
π1 > 0 and is finite. Suppose in contrary to the lemma, we had π2(w) < π1(w). Consider a v = (
π1+π2
2
, 0)
(point A in Figure 10). Such a v in BVL has an incentive to report to be in T
V
R (e.g. point B in Figure 10).
By Lemma 7 such a report earns him a utility of π1+π2
2
−π2 > 0, instead of the 0 utility he currently gets.
Lemma 9. For every deterministic DSIC+IR mechanism that gets a finite approximation factor,
∀w ∈ R2+ : w1 > 0 & π2 > π1,∀v ∈ B
V
R , we have {x
V
1 (v,w) = 1, x
V
2 (v,w) = 0, p
V (v,w) = π1(w)}
Proof. Fix a w ∈ R2+ s.t. w1 > 0. From Lemma 2 it is clear that for all v ∈ B
V
R , x
V
1 (v,w) = 1. As far as
allocation is concerned we only have to prove that for all v ∈ BVR , we have x
V
2 (v,w) = 0. Once we prove
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π1(w)
x = {1}
x = {2}
v1
v2
x = {∅}
p = π2(w)
π2(w)
p = π1(w)
45o
x = {1, 2}
p = π2(w)
π1(w)
x = {1}
x = {2}
v1
v2
x = {∅}
p = π2(w)
π2(w)
p = π1(w)
x = {1, 2}
45o
x = {1, 2}
p = π2(w)
π2(w)
p = π2(w)
B
A
Figure 11: If the threshold for item 2 is strictly larger than that of item 1, then every bid in BVR is allocated only item 1 and charged
π1(w) (left). Otherwise the right figure portrays a profitable deviation.
this, the fact that pV (v,w) = π1 for all v ∈ B
V
R immediately follows from Lemma 4. To prove that for all
v ∈ BVR we have x
V
2 (v,w) = 0:
1. We first show that for some point v ∈ BVR we have x
V
2 (v,w) = 0. Suppose not. Note that by Lemma 7
there is a non-empty set T VR where bidder V gets both items and pays π2. DSIC therefore implies that
at any point where bidder V gets both items he pays π2, including the region B
V
R under consideration.
Consider a point (π1+π2
2
, 0) ∈ BVR (point B in Figure 11). Such a bidder, by our assumption gets
both items allocated and has to therefore pay π2 which is strictly larger than his value, violating IR.
Therefore there is at least one point in BVR where x
V
2 (v,w) = 0.
2. We now show that for all points in BVR we have have x
V
2 (v,w) = 0. To see this, consider a point
v ∈ BVR where x
V
2 (v,w) = 1 (point A in Figure 11). Such a point, by the discussion in this paragraph,
pays π2. However, switching to a point where item 1 alone is allocated (there is at least one such point
by the discussion above) gives the bidder a utility of v1 − π1, which is strictly larger than his current
utility of max{v1, v2} − π2.
At this point, it is convenient to summarize our findings on how the threshold functions π2 and π1 almost
entirely determine the allocation for bidder V (and similarly φ1 and φ2 for bidderW ). Except for the region
BVR , the threshold functions π2 and π1 completely determine the allocation function for bidder V . In the
region BVR , bidder V could receive just item 1 or both items. Even in B
V
R , when π2 > π1, bidder V can just
receive item 1.
Corollary 10. Fix any w ∈ R2+ : w1 > 0. For every deterministic DSIC+IR mechanism that gets a finite
approximation factor, the allocation in the regions BVL , B
V
R , T
V
L , T
V
R should satisfy the following:
1. ∀v ∈ BVL , x
V
1 (v,w) = x
V
2 (v,w) = 0.
2. ∀v ∈ BVR , x
V
1 (v,w) = 1, x
V
2 (v,w) ∈ {0, 1}. Further, if π2 > π1, we have x
V
2 (v,w) = 0.
3. ∀v ∈ T VL , x
V
1 (v,w) = 0, x
V
2 (v,w) = 1.
4. ∀v ∈ T VR , x
V
2 (v,w) = x
V
2 (v,w) = 1.
5. Analogous characterization holds for BWL , B
W
R , T
W
L , T
W
R .
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π1(w)
x = {1}
x = {2}
v1
v2
x = {∅}
p = π2(w)
π2(w)
p = π1(w)
45o
x = {1, 2}
p = π2(w)
π1(w) = π2(w)
x = {1}x ={2}
v1
v2
x = {∅}
p = π2(w)
π2(w)
p = π1(w)
x = {1, 2}
45o
x = {1, 2}
p = π2(w)
p = π2(w)
x = {1, 2}
p = π2(w)
Figure 12: The allocation and payment functions have to look either like the figure on the left (if π2(w) > π1(w)) or like the figure
on the right (if π2(w) = π1(w)).
3.3 Arguing Simultaneously for Allocation Function of Both Players
Now, we assume that the mechanism gets an H approximation for some fixed number H . Using this we
argue that in a particular region of the type space, the mechanism must allocate both items. Using this
along with the necessary conditions we have so far, we eventually arrive at a contradiction, implying that
deterministic DSIC + IR mechanisms cannot get any finite approximation. We restrict our attention to the
following subset of R2+, for some N ≥ H and ǫ <
1
H .
SN,ǫ := {(x1, x2) ∈ R
2
+ : 0 < x1 < ǫ, x2 = N}.
Lemma 11. For every deterministic DSIC+IR mechanism that gets an H approximation, ∀N ≥ H,∀ǫ <
1
H ,∀w ∈ SN,ǫ, we have that
1. π1(w) < Hǫ.
2. If further, v1 < Hǫ, then Item 2 is always allocated.
Proof. For any mechanism that gets an H-approximation, if item 2 doesn’t arrive, it is necessary that the
mechanism allocates item 1 to bidder V when v1 ≥ Hǫ given that w1 < ǫ.
For the second point, we have that w1 < ǫ and v1 < Hǫ, while w2 ≥ H . Thus not allocating item 2 to
any bidder at all results in an approximation factor of at least H since we have ǫ < 1H .
Lemma 12. For every deterministic DSIC+IR mechanism that gets anH approximation,
∀N ≥ H,∀ǫ <
1
H
,∀w ∈ SN,ǫ, we have π2(w)− π1(w) = cN . (1)
Proof. Consider any two points w,w′ ∈ SN,ǫ. We show that any mechanism that gets an H approximation
has π2(w) − π1(w) = π2(w
′)− π1(w
′) for all such w and w′.
1. Suppose not. Assume without loss of generality that π2(w)− π1(w) < π2(w
′)− π1(w
′).
2. Note thatmax{π1(w), π1(w
′)} < Hǫ from Lemma 11. This and bullet-point 1 above imply that there
exists a point v s.t. Hǫ > v1 > max(π1(w), π1(w
′)) and, π2(w)−π1(w) < v2−v1 < π2(w
′)−π1(w
′)
(point A in Figure 14).
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w1
w2
ǫ
N
1/H
H
w w′
SN,ǫ
π1(w)
v1
v2
π2(w)
45o
π2(w
′)
π1(w
′) H · ǫ
Figure 13: As the value of playerW moves in the set Sn,ǫ (depicted as the thick vertical line in the right figure), the thresholds of
player V for the two items, must be changing in such a way, that their point of intersection moves only along some fixed 45o line
that depends only on N .
3. Such a point v is included in BVR (w
′) and in T VR (w). Based on our characterization in Corollary 10
such a point v gets allocated the set of items {1, 2} (i.e., both the items) when bidder W bids w and
just {1} when bidderW bids w′.
• The astute reader might point out “Corollary 10 says that the allocation in region BVR (w
′) could
be {1} or {1, 2}, and it is {1} whenever π2(w
′) > π1(w
′). Do we know that π2(w
′) > π1(w
′)
to draw this unambiguous conclusion about allocation being {1} in BVR (w
′)? The answer is yes.
To see this, note that by Lemma 8 π2 ≥ π1 at both w and w
′. The only question is whether
π2(w
′) > π1(w
′) or not. But w.l.o.g. we assumed that π2(w)−π1(w) < π2(w
′)−π1(w
′). This
immediately shows that π2(w
′) > π1(w
′).
4. Correspondingly, the allocation for bidderW when changing his bid from w to w′ changes from ∅ to
just {2} or ∅ to ∅. To see this note that when V gets {1, 2} clearly W gets ∅. But when V gets {1},
the bidderW could have possibly gotten {2} or ∅. Note thatW getting ∅ means that item 2 didn’t go
to any bidder at all.
w1
w2
ǫ
N
1/H
H
w w′
SN,ǫ
xW (A,w) = {∅}
xW (A,w′) = {2}
π1(w)
v1
v2
π2(w)
45o
π2(w
′)
π1(w
′) H · ǫ
A
xV (A,w) = {1, 2}
xV (A,w′) = {1}
Figure 14: If the intersection point in the allocation of player V (right) does not move along the diagonal, there exists a point A
such that the allocation of playerW (left), when player V has value A, moves from ∅ to Item 2. Such a transition inW ’s allocation
is not feasible as we move vertically.
5. But the possibility of item 2 not going to any bidder at all is ruled out by Lemma 11: note that w′1 < ǫ
and v1 < Hǫ. Given that item 2 should always be allocated, the only possible change of allocation
for bidderW when changing his bids from w to w′ is from ∅ to {2}.
6. Based on the definition of the 4 sets it follows immediately that when w2 is held a constant and w1 is
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varied, the point w moves either between BWL and B
W
R or between T
W
L and T
W
R , or between T
W
L and
BWR .
7. Our characterization in Corollary 10 shows that none of the three moves mentioned above can result
in an allocation change between ∅ and {2}. Indeed an allocation change between ∅ and {2} requires
a move between BWL and T
W
L , which is not among the three moves mentioned above.
Lemma 13. For every deterministic DSIC+IR mechanism that gets anH-approximation,
∀N ≥ H,∀ǫ <
1
H
,∀w ∈ SN,ǫ = {w ∈ R
2
+ : 0 < w1 < ǫ,w2 = N}, we have:
π1(w) = c1,N , and π2(w) = c2,N . (2)
w1
w2
ǫ
N
1/H
H
w w′
SN,ǫ
π1(w) = π1(w
′)
v1
v2
π2(w) = π2(w
′)
45o
H · ǫ
Figure 15: The thresholds in the allocation of V do not change asW moves in SN,ǫ, e.g. from w to w
′.
Proof. Consider any two points w,w′ ∈ SN,ǫ. We show that any mechanism that gets an H-approximation
has π1(w) = π1(w
′) and π2(w) = π2(w
′) for all such w and w′. Suppose not.
1. Lemma 12 says that π2(w)− π1(w) = π2(w
′)− π1(w
′). This means that either π2(w
′) > π2(w) and
π1(w
′) > π1(w), or π2(w
′) < π2(w) and π1(w
′) < π1(w). W.l.o.g. we assume that we are in the
former case, namely, π2(w
′) > π2(w) and π1(w
′) > π1(w).
2. The former statement implies that there exists a point v ∈ R2+ such that π1(w) < v1 < π1(w
′) and
π2(w) < v2 < π2(w
′), and v2 − v1 > π2(w) − π1(w). We also have max{π1(w), π1(w
′)} < ǫH
from Lemma 11 (point A in Figure 15).
3. Such a point v is included in T VR (w) and B
V
L (w
′). Thus, as the bid of bidder W changes from w to
w′, by Corollary 10, the allocation of bidder V for such a point v changes from {1, 2} (while in T VR )
to ∅ (while in BVL ).
4. Correspondingly, the allocation for bidderW when changing his bid from w tow′ could have changed
from ∅ to ∅, or ∅ to {1}, or ∅ to {2} or ∅ to {1, 2}. From Lemmas 5 and 11, we should always allocate
both items for the bid ranges we have considered. Thus, the only possible allocation change for bidder
W as his bid changes from w to w′ is from ∅ to {1, 2}.
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w1
w2
ǫ
N
1/H
H
w w′
SN,ǫ
xW (A,w) = {∅}
xW (A,w′) = {1, 2}
π1(w)
v1
v2
π2(w)
45o
H · ǫ
π2(w
′)
π1(w
′)
A xV (A,w) = {1, 2}
xV (A,w′) = {∅}
Figure 16: If the thresholds for player v change as the value ofW ranges over SN,ǫ, e.g. from w to w
′, then when V has type A the
allocation ofW switches from the ∅, under w, to winning both items, under w′. The latter is impossible, given our characterization
of feasible allocation functions.
5. Based on the definition of the 4 sets it follows immediately that when w2 is held a constant and w1 is
varied, the point w moves either between BWL and B
W
R or between T
W
L and T
W
R , or between T
W
L and
BWR .
6. Our characterization in Corollary 10 shows that only one of the three moves mentioned above could
possibly result in an allocation change between ∅ and {1, 2}, namely from BWL to B
W
R . But B
W
R has
an allocation of {1, 2} only when φ2 = φ1. The point w being in B
W
L and w
′ in BWR means that
w1 < φ1 = φ2 < w
′
1. But note that w1, w
′
1 < ǫ, where as w2 = w
′
2 ≥ H >> ǫ. On the other
hand since w ∈ BWL it means that φ2 > w2 ≥ H . It is impossible to have the following conditions
satisfied:
• φ2 = φ1
• w2 = w
′
2 ≥ H and 0 < w1, w
′
1 < ǫ
• w2 < φ2 and w1 < φ1 = φ2 < w′1
7. This means that our contrary assumption can’t hold. This proves the Lemma, namely, π2(w) = π2(w
′)
and π1(w) = π1(w
′).
Proof of Main Theorem. From Corollary 10 it is intuitively clear that once π2(w) and π1(w) are de-
termined, they almost entirely determine the allocation function in the type-space of bidder V . But now
Lemma 13 (basically Equation 2) shows that π2 and π1 remain unchanged when w moves in the set
SN,ǫ. This therefore means, when w moves in the set SN,ǫ, the allocation to bidder V for any given bid
v ∈ (0,Hǫ) × R+ (except for the indifference points in the boundary region) remains unchanged. There-
fore, the allocation of bidderW , which is simply the complement of the allocation to bidder V , also remains
unchanged, as w moves in SN,ǫ. This leads to an unbounded approximation factor. We will now make this
formal by first showing the following.
1. For any set S of w’s where π2(w) and π1(w) remain unchanged, let Q(S) = {v ∈ R
2
+ : v1, v2 >
0, v1 < Hǫ, v1 6= π1, v2 6= π2, v2 − π2 6= v1 − π1} be the set of v with v1 ≤ Hǫ, excluding the
indifference points in bidder V ’s type space (the π’s are defined w.r.t. some arbitrary w ∈ S). The
allocation for indifference points could swing arbitrarily as w moves and therefore we will not focus
on them. We show that:
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ǫ
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SN,ǫ
∀w ∈ SN,ǫ : x
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1 (A,w) = 1
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W
1 (A,w) = 0
v1
v2
H · ǫǫ/H3/2
A
Figure 17: Our characterizations imply that the whether playerW wins item 1 or not, remains fixed for all w ∈ SN,ǫ for any v with
v1 ≤ H · ǫ (in particular for point A). This leads to unbounded approximation factor when only item 1 arrives.
∀N ≥ 2H,∀ǫ <
1
H
,∀w ∈ SN,ǫ = {0 < w1 < ǫ, w2 = N},∀v ∈ Q(SN,ǫ) we have:
xV1 (v,w) = f1,N(v), and, x
V
2 (v,w) = f2,N(v). (3)
To prove Equation 3, note that Corollary 10 says that the only region in bidder V ’s type-space where
π2 and π1 don’t accurately determine the allocation functions for bidder V is the region B
V
R where the
allocation could be {1} or {1, 2} in the case where π2 = π1. Except for this region, since π2 and π1
entirely determine the allocation of bidder V , Equation 2 directly implies Equation 3. We now show
that this corner case of π2 = π1 can’t happen by proving that
∀N ≥ 2H,∀ǫ <
1
H
,∀w ∈ SN,ǫ = {0 < w1 < ǫ, w2 = N}, we have π2(w) > π1(w).
To see this, note that it is necessary that π2 ≥ 1 because otherwise, the approximation ratio for giving
away item 2 with w2 ≥ 2H to bidder V with v2 < 1 is at least
2H
1+ǫ > H (the ǫ in the denominator
is for capturing item 1’s welfare of at most ǫ). On the other hand, as discussed in point 2 of the proof
of Lemma 12, we have π1 < Hǫ < 1. Thus π1 < 1 ≤ π2, eliminating the corner case we hoped to
remove.
2. Notice that the allocation to bidder W is simply the complement of allocation to bidder V because
the mechanism allocates both items, according to Lemmas 5 and 11. Thus,
∀N ≥ 2H,∀ǫ <
1
H
,∀w ∈ SN,ǫ = {0 < w1 < ǫ, w2 = N},∀v ∈ Q(SN,ǫ) we have:
xW1 (v,w) = 1− f1,N(v), and, x
W
2 (v,w) = 1− f2,N(v). (4)
Equation 4 leads to an unbounded approximation factor. To see this, consider the S2H,ǫ = {w ∈ R
2
+ :
0 < w1 < ǫ,w2 = 2H}. Fix a v s.t. v1 =
ǫ
H3/2
(if such a v1 happens to be a boundary point w.r.t.
S2H,ǫ, pick a v1 arbitrarily close to that point). Equation 4 implies that for all w ∈ S2H,ǫ, we have
xW1 (v,w) = 1 or x
W
1 (v,w) = 0, i.e., always 1 or always 0.
(a) Suppose xW1 (v,w) = 1 for all w ∈ S2H,ǫ. Then consider a point (w1 =
ǫ
H3
, w2 = 2H), and
focus on the case where item 2 never arrives. Giving item 1 to bidderW results in approximation
factor of
ǫ/H3/2
ǫ/H3
= H3/2 > H . Thus aH-approximation factor is not possible in this case.
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(b) Suppose xW1 (v,w) = 0 for all w ∈ S2H,ǫ. Then consider a point (w1 = ǫ/2, w2 = 2H) and
focus on the case where item 2 never arrives. Giving item 1 to bidder V results in approximation
factor of
ǫ/2
ǫ/H3/2
= H
3/2
2
> H . Thus aH-approximation factor is not possible in this case.
This means that a deterministic DSIC+IR mechanism cannot obtain a H-approximation for any H .
This proves the theorem.
4 Conclusion and Open Questions
In the largely unexplored space of truthful mechanisms for multi-parameter bidders with online supply, we
ask the first question that anyone would ask, and show a strong impossibility result. On the technical side,
our results shed ample light on the nature of restrictions that truthfulness and online supply place on the
kinds of allocation profiles possible. These restrictions are quite non-trivial and do not follow from simple
weak-monotonicity/cyclic monotonicity conditions. On the conceptual side, our results point toward what
might be reasonably expected in terms of truthfulness in an online supply setting. For instance, it says that
there must be some source of randomness for a mechanism to be able to guarantee any reasonable social
welfare. In this regard, there are several interesting directions that our work opens up.
Does randomness help? There are three prominent sources of randomness: a) Randomized mechanisms
b) Stochastic arrival and c) Bayesian setting (values drawn from a distribution). For each of these sources of
randomness, without using the other sources of randomness, what is the optimal approximation factor one
can get? Let n be the number of bidders and m be the number of items that could possibly arrive (lesser
number of items could arrive too).
Randomized mechanisms It is easy to get a min{n,m} approximation with a randomized mechanism.
Choosing one of the n bidders uniformly at random and allocating all items to her gives an n approximation.
Choosing one of them items uniformly at random, and selling that item using a second price auction, throw-
ing away all other items gives a factor m approximation (note that the adversary who decides the supply
doesn’t know the mechanism’s coin toss). Is there a mechanism that gets anything better than this trivial
min{m,n} approximation? What is the best approximation factor one can get? Logarithmic? Constant?
Note that the constant factor impossibility result of [8] doesn’t apply here because we allow payments to be
computed after knowing the entire supply. We conjecture that nothing better than the min{n,m} approxi-
mation with a randomized mechanism.
Stochastic arrival What happens if we allow arrival to be stochastic, according to a known distribution,
but ask for mechanisms to be deterministic? For the 2 bidder, 2 item setting we studied, here is a stochastic
arrival model. Item 1 arrives for sure, and item 2 arrives with a known probability p. If all we ask for is
a truthful-in-expectation mechanism, then one can get the optimal welfare by just implementing the VCG
mechanism, namely, compute max{v1 + pw2, w1 + pv2}. If the former is larger, bidder V gets 1 and W
gets 2, and if the latter is larger, bidder V gets 2 andW gets 1. Truthful payments are easy to compute.
But what if we ask for universal truthfulness over the stochasticity in arrival? For the simple setting
of 2 bidders and 2 items, there is a 2 approximation mechanism that allocates the first item to bidder V if
v1 ≥ max{w1, pw2} or bidder W if w1 ≥ max{v1, pv2}. When second item arrives, offer it to bidder
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V at a price of max{w1p , w2} + (v1 − max{w1, pw2})
+ and similarly offer it to bidder W at a price of
max{v1p , v2} + (w1 −max{v1, pv2})
+. Whoever wins the second item pays the posted price and nothing
more, even if they won the first item. If bidder V wins the first item alone (either because the second
item doesn’t arrive, or because he lost it), he pays max{w1, pw2} and similarly when bidder W wins the
first item alone, he pays max{v1, pv2}. It is easy to check that this mechanism is truthful, and gets a 2
approximation. Basically, the mechanism is guaranteed to get a welfare of max{v1, w1, pv2, pw2}, which
gives a 2 approximation. Is there a natural generalization of this mechanism to n bidders and m items that
gives amin{m,n} approximation? Are there are better approximations?
Bayesian setting What if bidders’ values are drawn from a (known) joint distribution? If the bidder’s
distributions are independent, how good an approximation factor can we get with deterministic mechanisms?
With randomized mechanisms can we get much better than the trivial min{m,n} approximation factor?
With the further restriction that the distributions across items are independent too, what are the best factors
possible? We currently don’t have answers to these questions even for the 2 bidder 2 item case.
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A Proof of missing lemmas and theorems
Lemma 14 (Restatement of Lemma 2). For every deterministic DSIC+IR mechanism, there must exist a
threshold function π1(w) such that:
∀w ∈ R2+, ∀v ∈ R
2
+ : x
V
1 (v,w) =
{
1 if v1 > π1(w)
0 if v1 < π1(w)
Proof. Consider the case where item 1 alone arrives. In this case, DSIC implies that xV1 (v,w) is monotone
in v1. I.e., for a fixed w and v2, there exists a threshold π1 that is independent of v1 such that x
V
1 (v,w) = 1
when v1 > π1 and x
V
1 (v,w) = 0 when v1 < π1. Furthermore, when v1 > π1 it must be that p
V (v,w) = π1
for DSIC and IR to hold (i.e., bidder V pays the “critical” or minimal payment required to get the allocation
he gets). This implies that π1 is independent of v2, because otherwise bidder A will have an incentive to
report the v2 for which π1 is the smallest. Thus π1 can be a function only of w. This proves the lemma.
Lemma 15 (Restatament of Lemma 3). For every deterministic DSIC+IR mechanism, there must exist a
threshold function π2(w) such that:
∀w ∈ R2+, ∀v ∈ R
2
+ s.t. v1 < π1(w) : x
V
2 (v,w) =
{
1 if v2 > π2(w)
0 if v2 < π2(w)
pV (v,w) =
{
π2(w) if v2 > π2(w)
0 if v2 < π2(w)
Proof. Fix a w. Consider the set S = {v ∈ R2+ : v1 < π1, x
V
2 (v,w) = 1}.
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1. Lemma 2 says that xV1 (v,w) = 0 for all v ∈ S. This means that for all v ∈ S ,we have x
V
1 (v,w) = 0
and xV2 (v,w) = 1, i.e., for all v ∈ S, the allocation for bidder V remains fixed. DSIC therefore
implies that pV (v,w) remains fixed for all v ∈ S.
2. pV (v,w) being fixed for all v ∈ S, together with DSIC means that there exists a threshold function π2
independent of v2 (but possibly dependent on v1, and of course w) such that the set S is sandwiched
as S− ⊆ S ⊆ S+, where S− = {v : v1 < π1, v2 > π2}, and S+ = {v : v1 < π1, v2 ≥ π2}. I.e.,
for each fixed v1, the allocation of item 2 for bidder V along the v2 axis jumps from 0 to 1 when
v2 > π2(v1, w) and stays 1 there after.
3. But does π2(v1, w) really depend on v1? Point 2 above, along with DSIC and IR implies that for all
v ∈ S−, we have p
V (v,w) = π2(v1, w) (i.e., DSIC demands that bidder V pay the minimal payment
to get the allocation he gets). This means that for all v : v1 < π1, we need π2 to be independent of
v1 because otherwise a v ∈ S− has an incentive to report a bid in argminv∈S−π2(v1, w). Thus π2 is
purely a function of w, proving the lemma.
Lemma 16 (Restatement of Lemma 4). For every deterministic DSIC+IR mechanism,
∀w ∈ R2+,∀v ∈ R
2
+ s.t. {x
V
1 (v,w) = 1, x
V
2 (v,w) = 0}, we have p
V (v,w) = π1
Proof. Fix a w. Let S = {v : xV1 (v,w) = 1, x
V
2 (v,w) = 0}. DSIC implies that p
V (v,w) remains the same
for all v ∈ S. Consider a v s.t. v1 ≥ π1 and v2 = 0. We claim that for such a v, p
V (v,w) = π1. Suppose
not and let pV (v,w) = p.
1. If p < π1, a bidder V with value (
p+π1
2
, 0) will deviate to report a v s.t. v1 > π1 and v2 = 0 to get a
positive utility instead of the 0 utility he currently gets.
2. If on the other-hand p > π1, then a bidder V with value (
p+π1
2
, 0)will deviate to report a v s.t. v1 < π1
and v2 = 0, to get a 0 utility instead of the negative utility he currently gets. This means that p = π1.
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